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 SPANISH PENSACOLA, 1700-1763 
by W ILLIAM  B.  GR I F F E N
A FTER MORE THAN a decade of explorations by Spain alongthe north and east shores of the Gulf of Mexico, a garrison
has founded with all urgency at a bay called Pensacola* in the
latter part of the year 1698 in an effort to keep other foreign
powers, namely France and England, from obtaining a foothold
in the region. These enemies of the Spanish dominions, so
thought the Spaniards, would thus be obstructed from an area
from which they could attack Spanish shipping and from which
they would be able to penetrate and usurp portions of the northern
Spanish colonies, principally Florida and the rich mining areas
of New Spain. For the first two-score years of its existence, this
bay with its garrison settlement was a much coveted prize for
Spain’s rivals. Spain herself felt that such an outpost would give
her command of the entire Mexican Gulf, although it was soon
learned that other areas of the region could also be settled and
fortified, as was done at Biloxi and Mobile by the French.
With the advent of Queen Ann’s War (known as the War of
Spanish Succession in Europe: 1702-1713) and the unification
afforded by alliance and the possession by both nations of Bour-
bon dynasties, much less rivalry obtained between the French
and Spanish than between either country and the English. While
the French continued to covet Pensacola for strategic and com-
mercial reasons, originally thinking that the Mississippi River
might empty there which would prove to be an outlet to the
south for her Canadian colonies, some cooperation was exhibited
with the Spanish on all levels. Indeed, local mutual assistance be-
tween Pensacola and the French settlements, particularly Mobile
founded soon after Pensacola, was notable throughout the period,
often saving the day for whichever colony might at the time be
in need. As the years passed, following the close of Queen Ann’s
War, French hostility increased, culminating in the War of the
Quadruple Alliance (1719-1721) during which France twice
captured the garrison settlement of Santa Maria de Galve.
* The name Pensacola, or Panzacola as the Spanish wrote it, came
from a small Indian tribe that occupied the area (Swanton, 1952). Until
the beginning of the 1720’s the Spaniards usually employed the phrase:
Santa Maria de Galve, although the use of Panzacola was not unknown
in these early years.
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With the termination of this war in 1721, both Spain and
France were well aware of their overestimation of the value of
Pensacola; and England, with her emphasis on commerce and her
general westward expansion, remained in effect the only contender
for this area. At the same time, both Latin nations maintained
their strong interest in constraining this expansion and labored
to keep Pensacola out of British hands. The French returned to
their previous practice of lending assistance to the Spanish pre-
sidio, while concentrating their energies more toward the west in
the Louisiana colony in the area of the Mississippi. The Spaniards
first attempted to scuttle the port by lowering the water level of
the bay. When this ludicrous idea proved impossible, a small
garrison was reestablished. In 1763 England finally had her
way; winning the region, not by war but by treaty, only to loose
it again after twenty years.
THE  SETTLEMENT
Once the establishment of the garrison settlement at Pensa-
cola became permanent, it was confronted, as it was continually
throughout its history, with such crucial problems as those of
supplies and the maintenance and rehabilitation of fortifications;
not to speak of the vicissitudes of storms, fires, and enemy Indian
attacks. It proved to be a constant battle; indeed, the position of
Pensacola was often slightly less than precarious. It was even more
unfavorable than was that of Saint Augustine over on the east
coast of the Province of Florida. * Saint Augustine had at least
developed its own economy to some degree, with its tribute sys-
tem through the mission chain in corn and other crops and some
cattle raising, mainly in the Alachua and Apalache areas, al-
though the latter were decimated in the year 1704 and never
fully rehabilitated. Pensacola had virtually none of this, and it
was situated on even less fertile soil than was Saint Augustine.
It was, with little doubt, one of the most difficult of the posts in
the Spanish system of frontier defenses.
At the root of many of Pensacola’s perennial problems were
the climate, the configuration and infertility of the land, the
quality of the personnel - often the majority of whom were con-
victs - and lastly the delays in subsidy shipments. To make it even
* While it is true that the entire area of North America north of New
Spain was called Florida at one time, at this period administratively it
was not a part of Florida: its garrison and subsidy were entirely separate
from those of Saint Augustine and the Florida Province.
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worse, the presidio often did not even have an adequate vessel
with which to communicate with its headquarters in New Spain,
causing it to be almost entirely dependent upon the frequently
sporadic arrival of ships from the home base. At times, the Pensa-
colans were forced to use French bottoms when it was necessary to
send an urgent message to the New Spain officials.
Many of the Spaniards who served in the presidio reported
the unfavorability of the climate and land of the surrounding area.
The engineer Jaime Franck, one of the first, writing in June of
1700, remarked that these had been highly overrated and Pensa-
cola would prove to be much too expensive. It would serve no
other purpose than to waste the funds of the Royal Treasury, and
to shorten the days of those unfortunate persons who would go to
live in it. Furthermore, it would merely be of service to a greedy
governor who would be in a position to pocket the money sent for
salaries and for fortifications.
Two years later, Commander Don Francisco Martinez, com-
plaining of the general conditions he was obliged to put up with,
including the lack of defense, commented acidly on the “exorbi-
tant expense” to the King of maintaining Pensacola and its sub-
sidiary presidio, San Joseph. In 1714, the Viceroy, who had little
use for Pensacola, wrote that this maintenance amounted to
around 100,000 pesos annually, adding that, apart from the
presidio’s lack of defensive value, its land was useless and it was
constantly ravaged by sickness.
T H E  FO R T
The wooden fort called San Carlos de Austria, a four-bas-
tioned stockade with a parapet of sand fill, was a constant source
of preoccupation. Statements from two men who knew the castillo
in the beginning years provide both rather accurate prognostica-
tion of its subsequent history and excellent summary of the con-
tinual complaints that were to follow.
In June of 1700 when Franck was writing, the fort was al-
ready rotting, and its construction, which was still in process,
was a task, in Franck’s opinion, that in effect would never be
finished. The location of the fort was poor: it was dominated
by the Barranca of Santo Tome and the strong winds constantly
caused the sands to shift with detriment to the structure. Further-
more, it would be virtually useless for defense owing to the poor
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quality of men employed to man the base. In any event, the
available artillery in its location at that time was not sufficient
to prevent enemy vessels from entering the bay. In December of
1702, the time of the English siege on Saint Augustine, with
the fear that the hostilities might spread to Pensacola, Com-
mander Don Francisco Martinez reported that the fort was hardly
worth the name, consisting “solely of a quadrangle of logs which
would serve only as a stopping-over place for the enemy.”
The wide entrance into the bay posed a serious problem of
defense, a problem that was never fully solved. It was frequently
requested that at least a small fortification be put up at Punta de
Siguenza in order to be able to better cover the area with the
available fire power. This was a task, however, that was not
effectuated until the latter part of 1718 and San Carlos remained
almost the sole defensive structure of Pensacola until destroyed
after its second capture by the French.
In 1712, Governor Salinas Varona asked that San Carlos
itself be moved across the bay to Santa Rosa Island. Apart from
the usual advantages to general defense, he also pointed out the
advantage in water supply. On the mainland water holes could
not be made in the sand near the shore because of the unceasing
encroachments of the sea, a situation that reduced the supply the
greater part of the year for San Carlos to that provided by one
cistern. On the island there were eight small creeks of fresh water
and sea-shore water holes could easily be sunk.
Although the fort was in constant disrepair, the vicissitudes
undergone by the other buildings of the presidio were even
worse. Fires were forever ravaging the structures. One of the
worst conflagrations was that of November 23, 1704, in which
the royal buildings, warehouses, guard house, and bread ovens
were burned. The powder magazine was the only thing that
escaped. Both the French at Mobile and the Viceroy of New
Spain sent relief after this tragedy. One of the principal reasons
for such disasters was the use of flimsy roofing material, palm
thatch, which soon became dry and completely inflammable.
Again, when enemy Anglophile Indians attacked in 1707, all
buildings outside the fort were destroyed.
Sustinence
The garrison was supplied almost entirely from New Spain
and shortages in provisions were frequent because of delays in
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the shipments. At times, the ships bearing the needed victuals
and munitions would be destroyed by storms and treacherous
reefs. Not all provisions came from New Spain. Often the French
settlement of Mobile, or some other, would furnish the presidio
with enough to tide it over until the arrival of the subsidy ship,
an arrangement that worked to the benefit of all concerned since
as likely as not the French were the needy party when the Pensa-
cola larders were relatively well stocked, and reciprocation was the
procedure.
Occasionally supplies would come from other sources, as in
the year 1700 when Saint Augustine sent some extra corn that it
could spare, and in 1702 when the Pensacolans recurred to
Apalache for the same product.
There was an attempt, however, to produce some foodstuffs
locally. Jaime Franck in his report of June 4, 1700, complained
of the sterility of the soil, as it consisted only of sand and some
pine groves and would not produce either corn or wheat. For two
consecutive years a field was sown in a large section of the forest
that had been cleared away. Even with daily care and irrigation by
some of the Indians and convicts, only a few radishes, cauliflower,
melons, and squash were harvested. Nor was there a single fruit
tree in the area, such as those found in New Spain or Apalache.
Attempts to raise crops, nevertheless, were continued. In a plea
for supplies from Salinas Varona, on July 15, 1713, it was stated
that the need for food had been increased with the loss of the
crops during the preceding two years.
Animal husbandry was also practiced to some slight extent. In
the first decade after the founding reference to sheep raising is
made and immediately preceding the end of the first Spanish
occupation cattle come into the picture. Governor Don Miguel
Roman de Castilla in the spring of 1761 reported that there were
three haciendas (plantations) in the area which already had over
fifteen head of cattle and that other (unstated) products of the
soil had begun to be produced. These, he felt, within two to
three years would afford enough meat to supply the entire presidio
of Pensacola, possibly somewhat of an overstatement. The haci-
endas, San Antonio, La Luz, and Santisima Soledad, respectively
seven, three, and two leagues distance from Pensacola, were
destroyed together with the Indian towns of Punta Rasa and
Escambe during the Talapoosa uprising of that same year.
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Thus the settlement proved to be a continual drain on the
Royal Treasury. The only economic return of the area was that of
furnishing ships’ masts for the Spanish navy. The supply ships
from New Spain the greater part of the time would return to their
home port with cargoes of tree trunks.
Garrison
In the early years, the garrison was reported to consist of a
total of 220 places (not all of which were necessarily filled). Don
Francisco Martinez, in 1702, described this number as comprising
one hundred and fifty infantrymen in two companies, twenty
artillerymen and sailors, and fifty convicts for labor. The next
year, Don Andres de Arriola advised that there were one hundred
and ninety-three men to man the Pensacola base. However,
another governor in 1708, Don Sebastian de Moscoso, during a
period of intense Indian hostilities, reported that there were only
a little over one hundred, many who did not have sufficient
equipment, some not even swords. In 1713, two hundred and
twelve places in the presidio were said to be filled, but these in-
cluded twenty-five women.
These figures are fairly representative of the military popu-
lation throughout the entire period. However, they do not indicate
the total of the able-bodied defenders of the post as many men
were constantly off from duty because of sickness, many died
owing either to malnutrition or to enemy attacks, and others were
captured by Indians, usually allies of the English. These conditions
caused many men to desert; others merely rebelled, occasionally
incited by their officers.
From the time of the founding, it was customary to recruit
convicts for duty in Pensacola, either as soldiers or as laborers,
and this situation was often one of the sharpest of the many
thorns in the sides of her commanders. Arriola wrote in 1702
that because of this most of the men did not deserve to hold
military posts. Two years earlier, Franck had written that the run
of the men at Pensacola were not only a discredit to the Royal
Arms, but that they were the greatest enemies of the Crown. The
desertion rate was extremely high. However, because of the bad
name of Pensacola in New Spain, it was virtually impossible to
recruit volunteers.
In the early years, the plan was apparently to hold down
these convicts, troops, or laborers, with regular infantry taken
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from the armada. Later, even this practice was for the most part
abandoned.
Civilians
Apart from the military population, there were non-military
persons such as religious personnel and the aforementioned labor-
ers. The latter, both convict and Indian, included such occupa-
tions as carpenters and blacksmiths. In 1704, three Franciscan
chaplains were reported; in 1713, there was only one, a French-
man who spoke very poor Spanish. In the early portion of the
period the hospital was manned by the medico-friars of the order
of San Juan de Dios, but apparently by 1713 there was not even
one of these men left at the base to perform this valuable and
needed service.
An interesting aspect of the history and growth of Pensacola
at this time is that of the female population. When the presidio
was first founded it consisted strictly of soldiers and convict labor.
In the spring of 1704, Arriola found there four Spanish families,
plus Tabaza, Chacato, and a few Apalachino Indians, who had
come to Pensacola, driven from their homes in Apalache. Seeming-
ly, there were no other women than those included in the above
groups. Two years previously this had almost certainly been the
case as he had implored the Viceroy to send women to the presidio
owing to the unhealthiness of a large group of men without
female companionship. This request was subsequently turned
down for moral reasons on the grounds that one evil could not
rectify another. By 1713, as referred to above, there were at
least twenty-five women in the presidio, as these were listed as
receiving subsidy. While the growth of their numbers is not
continuous, over one hundred women were reported in August
of the year 1760 by Governor Don Miguel Roman de Castilla
during Indian hostilities. This is about the same number as given
for the evacuation in 1763.
An Informative Letter
A letter, written less than two years after the founding of
the presidio by a Captain of Infantry, Don Phelipe Serrano y
Perea, recapitulates many of the background conditions there:
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Sir,
It is not unknown that a person while lacking both the opportunity
and energy to meet his obligations should recognize his indebtedness with
the desire to satisfy them. Thus, Your Lordship, . . . while bearing in
mind the wretchedness of this retreat and exile that the Senor Count of
Montezuma, Viceroy of New Spain, has granted me in remuneration of
my misfortunes. . . .
There was the principal reason why I was issued a special Royal
Decree with a recommendation for one of the vacant positions in the
Windward Fleet, and a second Decree conceding me compensation for
the entire time I was held prisoner in France until the moment I was
reinstated in the said Fleet . . . . . When the occasion arose . . . . .
for the vacancy, I was obliged to accept duty in the austere solitude of
the presidio of Santa Maria de Galve, alias Panzacola, as commander of
one of the two infantry companies.
These companies are composed of troops of convicts and villainous
men, who are such, as much because of their crimes as because of their
character. There is no reason why this situation, which is not of my doing,
should be to my detriment, and especially, when the French population is
so proximate that we are only twenty-five leagues from it . . . . .
Not of less moment and consequence is the manner in which we here
are supplied. At best, our daily ration has been eight ounces of bread, or
corn, and another eight of meat, without any kind of vegetable or other
sustenance than salt water to season it. At the time of payment of salaries,
the two reals stipulated in the regulation of the amount of daily rations
are stricken off completely without either having been eaten or drunk up.
This, Sir, is not the worst. This amount is even reduced to the point of not
granting it, as has happened during the starvations that this post has
undergone from the time of its establishment; and, it has always been in
need of this miserable ration. This has forced us to nourish ourselves with
bitter acorns and tree roots which has been the source of so much sickness
and death and has caused the entire kingdom of New Spain to hold this
place in horror: it was first necessary to settle it in all its sterility, and
now it has been consumately parched by the terror occasioned from the
delayed measures for supplying it, plus worse provisioins that are sent
with full knowledge that we have no other recourse in this wilderness.
Recourse was found only on one occasion, and among the very savages
that inhabit it, which was not a little luck, at the beginning when we were
obliged to gratify them in order to win their friendship and to instruct
them in the Christian faith. The latter has been carried out with ease by
our French neighbors by buying the Indians with gifts which we Spaniards
did not have and for which reason we have never seen the aborigines again.
Goodness knows that at the present we need their friendship, and it is
solicited with all earnestness so that they will support us in the present
situation, especially since the troops are stirred up and keep us ever watch-
ful and vigilant. The latter, since they are convicts, are the greatest
enemies we have here. If now, at the beginning, we are so close to the
end, in what condition will we be afterwards?
All of these causes and reasons, Sir, force me to recur to the great
commiseration of Your Lordship in order that, while you are reminded of
my past misfortunes and of my deplorable remuneration for them in this
wretchedness, I can prevail again upon the powerful protection of Your
Lordship in order to free myself from this ruin. There is no just excuse
to continue in this peril while being aware of the risk, moreover, when
my grief is only increased by finding myself neither in the position nor
place to be able to keep up my obligations to my mother and unmarried
sisters. . . .
I place the matter of the relief from my position here in the hands
of Your Lordship, as my Lord and as the person from whom I have
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received so much and from whom I hope to receive more. Consequently, I
feel at liberty to tell Your Lordship that my request is only to leave this
exile with a good record for the purpose of continuing in the Royal
Service in the Windward Fleet, whether it be a post granted by the
authority of His Majesty or one with only the salary of a captain at
half-pay . . . .
For this purpose I am remittting to Your Lordship the attached cer-
tification from the commander who at present governs this presidio as there
are no Royal Treasury Officials. Thus, it will be evident that I am con-
tinuing to serve the position of Captain without a single supplement.
Of the positions of officers I must inform Your Lordship. Their crea-
tion by the Senor Viceroy was fruitless. The staff officers are a remark-
able endproduct from whose income of Mexican monies an entire infantry
regiment could be maintained besides the garrison. Moreover, these officers
are scarcely in token possession of their positions, as in no way can they
claim to serve any purpose for the defense of the presidio. The garrison
was maintained previously at the order of the Chief Commander and his
assistants. . . .
This is the extent of what I have to report to Your Lordship in com-
pliance with my duty. May God protect Your Lordship the many years
that He can, that I wish and deem necessary.
Santa Maria de Galve, October 24, 1700
My Dear Sir
Your Most Humble servant at your obedience
[signed] Don Phelipe Serrano y Perea
[rubric]
Senor Don Martin de Sierralta, My Lord.
During the early years after the founding Sergeant General
Don Andres de Arriola was tireless in his work to build and main-
tain the presidio. On one of his many visits to the base to deliver
the subsidy, after making some preliminary measurements, he
called a meeting of the military officers to decide the question of
a new fortification on Santa Rosa Island to complement the
defenses of the fort San Carlos on the mainland. At this time,
July 1701, he had with him his engineer officer, Don Juan de
Siscara. The fortification was in effect decided upon by the
officers with the exception of Siscara, who dissented.
This seems to be one of the many times Siscara disagreed with
the practical Arriola who had little respect for the opinions of his
engineer. The latter reported that a certain type of stone suitable
for construction purposes was abundant in the area. Arriola, after
inspecting it, stated that it was nothing more than “sand mixed
with some clay” that disintegrated on contact with water.
On December 16, 1701, the Frenchman Iberville arrived in
Pensacola on his way to settle and fortify Mobile Bay some twelve
leagues to the west. With an exchange of notes, Sergeant Major
Martinez, the officer left in command during Arriola’s many
absences, requested that Iberville desist from carrying out the
orders he carried from his government. The latter refused, stating
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that the interests of his Crown were also those of the Spanish
government. He did lend one of his ships to the Spaniards in
order that they could advise the Viceroy in New Spain and re-
ceive instructions. 
The presidio was, during this period, slowly being built up in
the face of many setbacks. In 1701, Arriola had a hospital
established and staffed it with two surgeon-friars whom he had
brought with him from Veracruz, while repairing some of the
batteries and rebuilding the guard house that had been damaged
in the fire. The hospital was put up none too soon as the next
year a severe epidemic broke out among the men on the voyage
to the settlement in June. The sickness spread to the presidio,
decimating the men. One of the friar-surgeons, Fray Joseph de
Salazar, wrote of Arriola during the epidemic, stating that the
latter on seeing the great lack of facilities for so many sick
purchased a house of boards from one of the soldiers for addition-
al hospital space. By the time of this writing, all the medicine was
gone and the only cure possible was that of divine intervention.
Salazar implored the Viceroy to send medicine, sheets, and pillows.
Such were the fortunes of Santa Maria de Galve during the
first years. In 1707, the presidio was plagued with the very
common maladies of short rations, faulty equipment, and sick,
underpaid, underfed, and rebellious troops. On August 12, some
twenty to thirty enemy Indians moved in on the outskirts of the
camp outside of the fort and began to burn houses that belonged
to friendly Ocataze Indians. A few of these were taken prisoners,
including women and children. While the enemy was sacking
some of the dwellings, Sergeant Major and Interim Governor Don
Sebastian de Moscoso had one of the artillery pieces fired. In the
confusion of the flight of the enemy, a sailor and an Indian
captured previously at an outlying guard station, together with
some of the Ocataze Indians, managed to escape to the castillo.
The alert was sounded for the remainder of the night and the
next day inspection patrols were sent out, but the enemy was not
located.
The succeeding day ten men, including three convicts, dis-
appeared while out a little distance from the fort washing clothes.
On the third day following, a troop of some three hundred Indi-
ans attacked the castillo and put the garrison to battle for a period
of three hours. Twenty-four hours later the enemy hit again, uti-
lizing the standing buildings for cover while firing and sacking
10
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the houses. Eventually they retired, taking with them the four
horses that belonged to the presidio, plus clothing and other
movables filched from the dwellings.
Shots were again exchanged with the Indians on the 18th
and more enemy appeared on the scene carrying an English flag
which they placed on one of the houses within sight of the fort.
Moscoso again caused an artillery piece to be fired, an event
that only excited the enemy and intensified the battle until night-
fall. The Indians then set fire to the camp outside the castillo
which was reduced to ashes.
On the 19th the camp site was inspected for salvage during
which time the harrassing natives managed to take one prisoner,
following this up with a like capture the next day. With this last
episode the assault let up, although rumor had it during the
month of September that the enemy was returning. On this
account, eight Apalachinos fled the presidio, and the next month
a number of persons, Spanish and Indian, were captured while
out some distance from the protection of the fort where they
would go to bathe and to wash clothes.
Then, on the 27th of November, there appeared in front of
the castillo an Indian band, including some forty horses, ac-
companied by several Englishmen. The Spaniards were sent a
demand for complete surrender, which they emphatically refused.
Around dusk the stockade was besieged by the English and their
some two hundred Indian allies. The battle pitch increased with
the onset of darkness, the strongest point of the offense being
placed at the barranca of the sea side. This attack lasted the rest
of the night.
The succeeding day the same two Englishmen, who had gone
to the fort the day before, reappeared with the same message
which in turn elicited a similar response on the part of the
Spaniards. Moscoso, with the intention of fighting it out, then
put himself to the task of making a thorough inspection of his
defenses. The most appalling thing was the few able-bodied
troops he had at his disposal: many men died in the preceding
few months and the majority of those remaining were suffering
from one kind of malady or another. He issued a plea to the non-
combatant convicts to take up arms to assist the military, offering
them their freedom when hostilities were over. They gave their
assent and were distributed arms. During the afternoon a few
11
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shots were exchanged, killing one Spaniard; three more were
wounded that evening.
On November 29, a few skirmishes took place, and on the
30th one of the men captured the previous month while out
cutting wood returned with a message from the English to the
effect that the latter were giving up the fight.
One week later, Monsieur de Bienville arrived from Mobile
with over one-hundred reinforcements, tardy but not unwelcome.
This was the last relatively large scale Indian attack reported for
some time, although minor skirmishes did occur, and occasionally
men would disappear. On June 3, 1708, Moscoso recounted that
he had not undergone another actual attack, but a few roving
bands had been sighted and one ensign, who later escaped, had
been captured in March while hunting with some Indians, plus
two convicts who disappeared the same day.
These hostilities loom large in the local history of Pensacola.
During the year 1712, the governor Don Gregorio de Salinas
Varona reported that the presidio had been besieged by Indians,
once in March which lasted the greater part of the month, when
the French governor at Mobile offered his assistance with supplies,
arms, and munitions. Enemy Indians attacked at least twice
again but, fortunately, had not made another appearance by Janu-
ary of the following year.
At this time, 1713, Salinas was still short subordinate officials
to assist him. There was no Sergeant Major, a post second in rank
only to the governor. One commanding officer had been captured
in the company of twenty-four soldiers and convicts who were
out on a wood-cutting detail. Three of these men, in addition to
a friar, were killed. This loss made the defense of Pensacola al-
most impossible. Moreover, the remaining lesser officials were
worse than the soldiers they commanded; they constantly incited
the men, oftentimes to request the impossible.
As he and other governors before him had done, Salinas
Varona in the spring of 1717 renewed his plea for a small forti-
fication at Punta de Siguenza, French activity in the Gulf region
was increasing and an unidentified ship had arrived at Pensacola
and had indulged in some reconnaissance. This would not have
been possible with the oft-requested defense work on the tip of
Santa Rosa Island. He also urged that more Spanish vassals be
settled in the area.
12
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France vs. Spain at Pensacola
Salinas’ fear of French encroachments was not ill-founded.
A year later, on May 12, 1718, the French occupied St. Joseph’s
Bay. In the same year they founded New Orleans. Then on May
13, 1719, a French force from Mobile captured the small battery
at Punta de Siguenza on Santa Rosa Island that had been estab-
lished only a few months before. An officer with some soldiers
dispatched from San Carlos that day were also taken prisoners.
On the following day the Spaniards on the mainland could descry
three ships bearing French flags which began to fire on the fort.
The ensuing battle lasted about three hours but the Iberians,
under a new commander, Don Juan Pedro Matamoros de Isla,
could not resist the French forces and were obliged to capitulate.
It was then that the Spaniards received their first notice of the
war between France and Spain that had broken out in Europe in
January.
News of the loss of the fort, and with it Pensacola, was re-
ceived by the Viceroy on June 29 from Don Gregorio de Salinas
Varona, who had been recently transfered to the governorship of
St. Joseph’s Bay, and preparations were immediately begun to
ready an expedition to retake the base. In the early part of July,
fifteen ships sailed from Havana under the command of Don
Alfonso Carrascosa de la Torre, on an expedition in the Royal
Service. Soon after departure, this force captured two French
frigates on their way to Havana to deposit the governor, officers,
and troops of the captured Pensacola. Carrascosa then returned
to Havana where it was decided to change his fleet’s original des-
tination to Pensacola. He sailed July 19, his forces augmented
by the extra assistance sent by the Viceroy. He had with him some
1,200 troops, including one hundred and fifty men from the
Pensacola garrison.
This expedition arrived in Pensacola on August 14, 1719.
The day was calm and Carrascosa entered the bay, disembarking
one hundred men at Punta de Siguenza. He then proceeded to
surround the castillo of San Carlos and the ships anchored in the
bay. As the Spaniards commenced firing, the enemy abandoned
its two frigates, scuttling them by fire. One was saved, although
the flames consumed the other, and the some one hundred and
twenty men who escaped from the vessels retired to the castillo,
thereby augmenting that garrison. Artillery fire continued until
13
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six o’clock that evening. Carrascosa demanded capitulation,
conceding the French until ten o’clock the next morning to decide.
They gave up, and Don Juan Pedro Matamoros was back in the
governorship. The captured French garrison numbered three
hundred and fifty, of which forty deserted to the Spanish. The
remainder were sent to Havana.
But the French were soon to retake the presidio, and not to
relinquish actual possession until late in 1722 when they re-
turned it to Spain as part of the articles of peace of the War of
the Quadruple Alliance.
Punta de Siguenza
Don Alejandro Wauchope was chosen to repossess Pensacola
this second time. He departed from San Juan de Ulua, New
Spain, on November 10, 1722, with three ships: a frigate, a
packet-boat, and a sloop, arriving at his destination on the 25th.
The next day, Wauchope went ashore where he encountered the
French Infantry Lieutenant, Jean Baptiste Rebue and the seven-
teen soldiers under his command, plus the only shelter left that
also doubled as the fortification, a miserable hut. Here Wauchope
received official possession of Pensacola, including the artillery,
munitions, and other military supplies.
He carried with him the ridiculous orders mentioned above
to determine the feasibility of making a cut across Santa Rosa
Island which would drain and thereby lower the water level of
the bay sufficiently to close off the entrance to large vessels of
war. If this were not practicable, a fort was to be constructed
at Punta de Siguenza, to be manned by one hundred and fifty
men, comprising infantry and artillery. The garrison of San
Joseph was to be transferred to the new Pensacola.
Wauchope in studying the defense possibilities of Punta de
Siguenza, found it completely useless to fortify as it was “a low
spot of extremely loose sand, full of marshes and besides, on
digging to a depth of two palms, water is encountered that issues
forth as a spring.” Not only this: in foul weather the sea washed
completely over the location. A fort could feasibly be built farther
from the shore but this would render it virtually useless for de-
fense. He picked a spot, about one-half a mile from the site
originally planned for the castillo, and which enjoyed the protec-
tion of the first trees of the island. The best fortification would
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be a quadrangular fort with a total of forty-eight cannon, one-half
to be 18-pounders and the remainder 12-pounders, manned by
three hundred places, rather than the one hundred and fifty
carried in his orders. Investigation was also made regarding pos-
sible materials for construction since the sand was too loose to
support such heavy materials as tabby, brick, or stone. Moreover,
stone, if used, would have to be brought in from Havana. Wood,
felt Wauchope, would be satisfactory as it was to be found in
relative abundance and of such quality that it would endure for
years, wet or dry, above or below ground.
He also recommended another fort, opposite Punta de Si-
guenza on the mainland but not at the location of the old San
Carlos because the latter had been dominated by sand dunes and
the sea had undermined it. The site he suggested, situated on
the dune named “El Almirante” (one of those that had dominated
the old fort) would afford a great advantage in warding off any
enemy ship that might attempt the entrance of the bay.
Wauchope sent his ships to the Bay of San Joseph to fetch
the garrison there, which returned with Captain Pedro Primo de
Rivera and sixty soldiers, plus artillery, supplies, cables, and
bark. A few days earlier, a French launch had arrived at the
presidio to transport the troops of the previous owners to their
own territory.
Despite recent hostilities, relationships with the French were
again quite excellent. But by this date Wauchope had received
orders from the Viceroy for the Spanish to cease intercourse with
their Gallic neighbors for fear of the illicit trade that might (in all
probability, would) take place. He later confirmed these orders
in a plea to keep the presidio well supplied, stating that the entire
French policy was “to introduce trade under any pretext and to
return home with the proceeds.” He emphasized the necessity to
keep adequate food on hand, since many times in the past Pen-
sacola “would have been abandoned had it not been for French
aid.”
In January, two sloops, sent from New Spain, arrived in
Pensacola with four months’ supplies for two hundred men and
four salary payments, sufficient to include the men from San Jos-
eph. In early February, he decided to depart, taking with him
eighty-four persons, including men, women, and children, of the
15
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people left over from St. Joseph’s. Twenty eight more persons
were left for the frigate to transport later to Veracruz. Wauchope
set sail for the latter port on February 13.
The Settlement on Santa Rosa Island
Alejandro Wauchope had arrived in Pensacola on November
25, 1722. By February 13 of the following year the new settle-
ment planned on Santa Rosa Island had begun to take shape.
At this time it was reported that there had already been built
a warehouse forty feet long, twenty feet wide, and twenty feet
high from cedar boards and nails from Veracruz; a powder box
made of the same material fifteen feet long, ten wide, and five
high, covered with hides; a paymaster’s office of the material from
Veracruz, twenty feet long, nine wide, and nine high; two bar-
racks, each forty feet long, eighteen wide, and eight high, con-
structed of the same material except for the roofs which were
brought in from San Joseph; a house for Captain Pedro Primo de
Rivera, twenty feet long, ten wide, and ten high, made of boards
from San Joseph and nails from Veracruz; a powder magazine ten
feet long, eight wide, and eight tall, constructed of boards from
San Joseph; twenty-four small buildings built also of San Joseph
material, roofed with bark, for the dwellings of the workmen,
convicts, and other persons of the populace; eight large houses
for the top officers; a cook oven for bread; and a look-out of
thirty-seven cubits in height, built between two trees with steps
leading up to it. Such was the shape that the new Pensacola was
taking at Punta de Siguenza where so often before it had been
requested to put up at least a small defensive work.
Thus the Pensacola on Santa Rosa Island remained until the
year 1752 when on November 3 it was almost entirely destroyed
by a severe hurricane. Little is known of its history during these
long years. No doubt the day-by-day story was similiar in its
broad outlines to that which has been reviewed to this point.
Following this storm, some of the inhabitants moved to the block-
house of San Miguel which stood several miles up the bay from
the old fort of San Carlos; the rest remained on Santa Rosa where
they threw up another blockhouse some little distance from the
site of the old Punta de Siguenza.
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The Third Pensacola
Then, in the early part of 1757, a new governor, Don Miguel
Roman de Castilla y Lugo, after a shipwreck on the French is-
land of Massacre, arrived and took over the place of San Miguel
which was to become the new presidio of Pensacola.
On August 26 word was received from Monsieur de Bell,
the French commander at Mobile, that the pagan Talapoosa In-
dians were moving up to attack Pensacola and Sa  d e
Apalache, irate over the killing of one of their caci  t h e
latter place. Pensacola did not yet have a stockade s e
Santa Rosa garrison had been moved to the mainland; the effec-
tive troops were greatly reduced by disease, and there was little
powder and few fire-arms - the warehouse possessed a scant thirty
extra flints. With this news, a number of defensive measures
were taken.
Since there was no adequate fort when Roman de Castilla
arrived, he had given orders for a stockade to be erected. This
had not yet been carried out, although wood was being cut some
eight leagues away. While waiting for the lumber to arrive,
Roman ordered set up three batteries for which he readied eleven
swivel guns and fourteen cannons, mounted on almost unservice-
able carriages, dispersing five advanced batteries of two cannon
each on the perimeter. The troops numbered one hundred and
fifty men, including sergeants, corporals, and sailors, and twenty-
five civilians.
He wrote the French commander at Mobile to send thirty
to forty Indians to join the natives of Escambe in an attempt to
obstruct the enemy at a place called Xarea. He also asked for
an armourer to come and repair the Spanish arms. The French
denied the request for the Indians, stating that they did not
wish to offend the other indigenous nations involved.
A portion of the lumber for the stockade arrived and the
area for a fort with four semi-bastions was marked out, compris-
ing within its confines a church, warehouse, barracks, hospital,
houses, and a few other buildings. The two sides of the fort that
protected the east and the north were finished at one hundred
and thirty-three varas and one hundred and ninety two varas *
respectively.
In September, the Franciscan missionary from the pueblo of
Punta Rasa arrived, accompanied by some of the Indians of his
*Approximately 33 inches.
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flock, with the report that a large body of the enemy was on its
way to Pensacola. On the 18th, word was received from Apalache
that the Talapoosas were laying siege to that place. Aid was
requested and Roman replied with a shipment of food.
Andres Escudero, a trusted Indian cacique who had been sent
to the Talapoosas, returned on October 10 with the report that
this enemy had changed its mind about attacking Pensacola.
Roman, who considered the Indians highly untrustworthy, de-
cided that work on the stockade must be continued immediately.
This was finished by the 15th with the exception of the section
that fronted on the sea.
In April, 1758, over one-hundred Talapoosas and Apiscas
came to Pensacola to affirm the peace. Together these two groups
elected Escudero as the Governor General of their newly form-
ed provinces, Roman assenting as he felt that the arrangement
would offer good control of these new subjects. Some of the
caciques were granted the Spanish title of Capitan de Guerra; the
head chief was given that of Capitan Comandante.
Roman de Castilla on April 18 commented on his own satis-
faction with this peace settlement. The Talapoosa tribe was one
of the most feared on the continent; they occupied the area be-
tween the French at Mobile and the Spanish territory to the east,
constituting a wedge to the north. In effect, he reported to the
Viceroy, now that such a fierce nation had allied itself with the
Spanish cause, the latter’s relations with the French and English
would be greatly improved. Roman exhorted his superior to aug-
ment supplies as, in order to maintain peace, it would be neces-
sary to make proper and adequate distribution of gifts, corn, and
chile. It was, however, not a year later when Roman complained
that the lack of provisions at Pensacola with which to favor the
Indians made the continuance of the peace extremely difficult.
The fort, no longer on the island, could easily be reached by the
Indians should they decide to go on the warpath.
Peace did reign, nevertheless, for the following three years.
During this time, according to Roman, Spanish jurisdiction was
extended to over thirty leagues from Pensacola, aggregating two
Indian pueblos to the Spanish government which were located
in such favorable areas that they would easily serve as buffers
against heathen Indians. Three haciendas were developed, and
the pueblos of Punta Rasa and Escambe made good progress.
Then, on February 2, 1761, the Alibama Indians hit the
town of Punta Rasa with a surprise attack. Three soldiers, a
19
Griffen: Spanish Pensacola, 1700-1763
Published by STARS, 1958
SPANISH  PENSACOLA ,  1700-1763 261
woman, and one small girl were killed. On the 9th the light
cavalry unit stationed at Escambe was also attacked. From this
point the enemy moved on to Pensacola, destroying the haciendas
and burning the dwellings and towns of the Spanish Indian allies.
Seven persons were lost, including four workers and one soldier,
murdered practically in plain sight of the presidio; movement
was restricted to an area a cannon shot away from the fort.
The uprising was general. A message was sent to the Tala-
poosas but by May no answer had been received. There were
barely one hundred and twenty men in garrison at Pensacola,
most of these useless, and it had been necessary to call back from
Punta Rasa twenty artillerymen and forty-three cavalrymen, only
nineteen of the latter who were properly outfitted. The Indians
f r o m  E s c a m b e  a n d  P u n t a  R a s a  w e r e  m o v e d  i n  t o  t h e
castillo, but only some twenty-five men were able-bodied enough
to be pressed into service. The cavalry was employed to escort
the inhabitants to a nearby creek for water and to patrol the area
immediately adjacent to the castillo; there were scarcely enough
men left to man the four semi-bastions and the artillery, leaving
the curtains almost defenseless. It almost goes without saying
that all kinds of supplies and munitions were short.
Roman managed to get the wives of some of the officers out
of the presidio to Havana and other places and lamented the fact
that he had no other safe place to put the over one hundred re-
maining women with a like number of children. To make matters
worse, on August 12 of the previous year, Pensacola had been
struck by a severe hurricane that damaged or destroyed almost
all the buildings of the presidio; the populace was living in ex-
treme discomfort.
Roman de Castilla also felt that the most effective defense
of the presidio was hampered by the system prevailing at that
time regarding the infantry and cavalry. He had objected
strongly to the reform introduced in 1757 to reduce the two
hundred man garrison by fifty men and with this number to form
a light cavalry unit.
A new governor, Don Diego Ortiz Parrilla, was commissioned
in 1761 to go to Pensacola to put down the Indian uprising be-
gun earlier that year. He took possession on October 21. The
place was in shambles. The troops had been practically unquar-
tered as the barracks had had no roofs since the hurricane of the
previous year; there had been many Indian hostilities; and the
men under the previous command had sometimes been mistreated.
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One other charge concerning a practice current throughout
the period and much of the Spanish Indies was that of illicit trade.
Roman had indulged in this type of activity. Indeed, soon after
Ortiz arrived a ship from the English house of William Walton
in New York arrived at the presidio to trade, expecting to find,
apparently, the two persons with whom they had dealt with one
time previously, Governor Don Miguel Roman and the Paymaster,
Don Juan de Ituarte.  Ortiz seized the ship and held i t  in
custody. At the time Ortiz was writing, there were fourteen
small stores, privately owned and with slight stocks, but with
excessive prices. Roman, it was known, had also possessed a store
of his own from which he dispensed goods, drinks, and come-
stibles.
For the next two-year period, under the governorship of Ortiz
Parrilla, the Pensacolans endeavored to rebuild and to develop
the presidio. When the British took over in 1763, after the sign-
of the Treaty of Paris, they were quite unimpressed. The fort was
in poor condition, possessing forty-four pieces of artillery of
miscellaneous sizes, and the woods had been allowed to grow
too close to the structure, a potential impediment to adequate
defense. Since the 1761 attacks, the Indian pueblo of Punta
Rasa had remained within the confines of the presidio. Almost
all the buildings encountered by the English had been built during
Ortiz’ term.
Upon consumating the transfer to the British, and with some
delay owing to efforts to obtain enough transports, Ortiz sailed
from the presidio with somewhat less than eight hundred evac-
uees, including over one hundred Christian Indians, plus their
movable effects. A few of the people went to Havana; the majority
departed for Veracruz where they arrived in September of 1763.
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